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he Spirit of Luxury: 
Shenstone, Delille,
and the Garden Theory
Thus winding through flowering shrubs we are conducted to the 
stables . . . but the first object that strikes us is a Venus de Medicis, 
beside a bason of gold-fish.
- A Description of the Leasowes
I
One cannot talk about the eighteenth-century garden without mentioning the lo­
comotive abilities of man’s body; the story of the Leasowes or Stowe belongs to 
the order of the foot. William Shenstone in one paragraph moves from aesthetics 
to politics, from the immovable eye to the mobile body. Criticizing the geometric 
patterns of the formal horticultural designs, the owner of the Leasowes estate writes: 
“To stand still and survey such avenues, may afford some slender satisfaction, 
through the change derived from perspective; but to move on continually and find 
no change of scene in the least attendant on our change of place, must give actual 
pain to a person of taste. For such an one to be condemned to pass along the famous 
vista from Moscow to Petersburg, or that other from Agra to Lahor in India, must 
be as disagreeable a sentence, as to be condemned to labour at the gallies. 1 As 
we shall see, Jacques Delille will think of spirit also in the categories of the foot 
and meandering path. *
' The Works in Verse and Prose of William Shenstone, Esq. (London: Dodsley, 1777), Vol. II, 
p. 116.
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II
Thus a certain science of taste is suggested, a science whose guiding signs have 
been partly established by Hume’s thought. At the center of this science is not just 
a man but “a person of taste”, i.e. one who is defined less in terms of a specific 
aesthetic preference, but one whose being refutes the principle of constraint and 
rigidly demarcated boundary. According to Hume, taste is a force which, ex­
panding human disposition towards pleasure and pain, follows a path upon which 
a double alienation is possible: first, taste singles man from those deprived of its 
blessings, second - by making human response ever more delicate and subtle, by 
ever enlarging his potential for being affected by reality - it opens a possibility 
of estranging man from his native, proper domain. “Delicacy of taste”, we read 
in Hume’s essay, “ has the same effect as the delicacy of passion: It enlarges the 
sphere both of our happiness and misery, and makes us sensible to pains as well 
as pleasures, which escape the rest of mankind.”2 *The man of taste is thus a notion 
in which works a critique of at least two aspects of the mid-eighteenth-century 
society: of the ever growing pressure of mercantile economy, and of the falsely 
egalitarian ideas of the early stages of mass society. To listen to Hume again: “They 
[emotions cultivated by taste] draw off the mind from the hurry of business and 
interest” and “delicacy of taste is favourable to love and friendship, by confining 
our choice to a few people, and making us indifferent to the company of the greater 
part of men”. ’
2 D. Hume, “Delicacy of Taste”, in D. Hume, Essays. Moral, Political, and Literary (Indian­
apolis: Liberty Fund, 1987), p. 5.
’ Ibid., p. 7.
4 F. Schiller, “Letter on the Aesthetic Education of Man”, in F. Schiller, Essays, eds.W. Hin- 
derer, D. Dahlstrom (New York: Continuum, 1993), p. 147.
To talk about “taste” implies a certain anthropology which presents man as 
a being which is never “completed”, never “well-placed”, a being which develops 
through distancing itself from its concerns (“business”) and its human environment 
(“the greater part of men”). Man is a being with and of a distance, thus never 
is in “one place”, a being never truly “domestic”. A step further along the same 
path could allow us to see in Shenstone’s thoughts on the garden a Romantic theory 
of freedom (in Hume still restricted by social mores and conventions) which sees 
in aesthetic activity a disposition towards fundamental freedom of human being. 
We read in Schiller’s 21 Letter on the aesthetic education of man that “By means 
of aesthetic culture . . . the personal worth of man, or his dignity, inasmuch as 
this can can depend solely upon himself, remains completely indeterminate; and 
nothing more is achieved by it than that he is henceforth enabled by the grace of 
nature to make of himself what he will — that the freedom to be what ought to 
be is completely restored to him”.4
The distance which seems to be the element of man precludes him from 
permanently rooting himself/herself anywhere: to be is to see a world always as 
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a stranger. This is one of the principle convictions of Dclille’s art of gardening 
which advices man to look with the eye of a stranger: “voyez . . . vous-meme, 
aux ycux de Tctranger/ vous montrez vos travaux”/ This distance does not invite 
a radical transgression or questioning of the principles of ethics or economy; just 
the opposite, it suggests that the distance ought to be conceived of as a space where 
a shuttle-like movement between the extremes is possible, because it is only such 
a concept of distance which allows us to both know business and “draw our minds 
off it”, to recognize the social merits of “the greater part of men” in order to shun 
them, so as to, by keeping one’s distance, become again a more useful participant 
of the social exchange. It is a garden, with its proximity of nature and human 
intervention, of mercantile economy which makes it possible and rustic pastoral- 
ism that abounds in its territory, which presents us with an ideal model of such 
a distance.
If Hume’s doctrine of taste seems to, first, recognize boundaries in order to, 
second, transcend them, and if the garden is an ideal spatial model of this philo­
sophical proposition, it allows for a reading of Hume’s thought which would make 
it a partial opening for the Romantic masterplan of removing boundaries and 
a transferring of cognitive abilities from the eye to imagination. This opening must 
be called partial because while recognizing the significance of imagination, Hu­
me’s taste, in the final analysis, functions as a measure reintroducing regularity 
and orderliness. We learn from Hume that “To check the sallies of the imagina­
tion, and to reduce every expression to geometrical truth and exactness, would be 
the most contrary to the laws of criticism . . . But though poetry can never submit 
to exact truth, it must be confined by rules of art . . . ”.5 6 Thus, while Schiller will 
in his 1800 seminal essay “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry” reproach critics for 
being “border patrol of taste”,7 he might be attacking Hume, but on the other hand, 
we have to remember that his poetic principle of “disrupting boundaries”8 can be 
detected, in a budding form, in Hume’s disagreement to “check the sallies [a ‘sally’ 
is a ‘sudden breaking out by soldiers who are surrounded by the enemy’, thus an 
interruption of a boundary] of imagination”.
5 J. Delille, “Les Jardins”, in J. Delille, Oeuvres, Vol. 7 (Paris, 1810), p. 154.
6 D. Hume, “Of the Standard of Tase”, in D. Hume, Essays . . . ., p. 231.
7 F. Schiller, “On Naive and Sentimental Poetry”, in F. Schiller, Essays, p. 200.
8 Ibid., p. 200.
Ill
Shenstone seems to have learned Hume’s lesson. While complaining of the end­
less vistas of Russia and India, he practices certain cultural and political geogra­
phy which, for two reasons, locates the edges of Europe and Asia off the map of 
the science of taste. The first cause of Shenstone’s objection to the geometrical 
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garden design is ocular, the other philosophical. What takes place in the horticul­
tural theory and practice of the proprietor of the Leasowes is a discussion of the 
function of the eye in aesthetic process and a meditation on a difference-based 
distinction between nature and culture. Shenstone’s argument against the “slender 
satisfaction” of “perspective” is based on a charge that geometry destroys the unity 
of the human body as well as destabilizes the relationship between man and world. 
A double act of dislodging which needs to be inspected in some detail. The 
geometry of “straight line” (of what Delille called “une long alee droite”9) privi­
leges the eye over other organs and, by doing so, it turns the ocular into the 
dominating force which imposes its procedures and decisions upon them; things 
can become available to other organs only having been first inspected by the eye. 
In short, geometry spells the triumph of the immobile eye over the locomotive parts 
of the body, a triumph based not on the elimination of other organs but on pro­
posing sight-based protocols of knowledge, the process not only completed but also 
characteristically aggravated by the seventeenth century (“Keller and Grontkowski 
trace the tradition of associating knowledge with vision back to Plato, and they 
argue that by the seventeenth century the equivalence of knowing with seeing was 
a commonplace of scientific discourse . . . But when Descartes discovered that the 
eye was a passive lens ... he was forced to separate the seeing intellect from the 
seeing eye”10 112). Shenstone’s formula for this mechanism of the “straight line” holds 
that it constructs a space in which “the foot is to travel over, what the eye has 
done before”.11
"ibid., p. 155.
10 C. Rose, Feminism and Geography (London: Polity Press, 1993), p. 88.
11 The Works . . . vol. II, p. 115.
12 See Pere Rapin, Of Gardens. A Latin Poem in Four Books. English’d by Mr. Gardiner (Lon­
don, 1772).
Two most pronounced consequences of this “ocularisation” of space are the 
disintegration of the body in which the eye acts somehow “against” the foot, where 
no simultaneous pleasure of various organs is feasible (while the eye relishes a view, 
the foot stands in place; while the foot marches, the eye is always somewhere else, 
ahead of it), and the uninterrupted jurisdiction of the law of repetition which 
Shenstone understands as the erasure of difference (“a repetition of the same object, 
tree after tree, for a length of way together”). The philosophical reason for which 
geometrical design is under attack is a conviction that whereas culture operates 
by way of transactions of identity and repetition, nature makes use of the mech­
anism of variation and heterogeneity. The formal French garden practice and theory 
(as described, for instance, by Rapin'2) are founded not only upon the mercantile 
precepts of land propriatorship but, more importantly, upon a certain philosophi­
cal economy which wastes the natural supplies of difference and uniqueness in 
order to achieve the profit of identity and interchangeability. As Shenstone’s 
maintains in the same passage: “identity is purchased [emphasis added] by the loss 
of that variety which the natural country supplies every where, in a greater or less 
degree”. One should note the verb in this fragment which not only conveys the 
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operations of economy (“purchasing” as bying) but also speaks of the eagerness 
of pursuit (Old French purchacer, to pursue eagerly) and brutality of hunting 
(French chacer and English chase). Thus, the identity principle which Shenstone 
detects as a corner stone of the French garden is obtained at the cost which Hume’s 
“man of taste” was not willing to pay. Rapin’s seventeenth-century theory or the 
practice of his compatriot Le Notre, through their strategies of interchangeability 
of repetitive forms exempt from the operations of surprise, perpetuated that “hur­
ry [or ‘chase’] of business [or ‘purchase’] and interest” which Hume wanted to 
counter in his theory of taste. If the seventeenth century promulgates the world 
of the pleasures of the eye supported hy the economy of repetitive commod­
ities, a century later the “man of taste” rediscovers other organs of the body, 
unconceals the pleasures of mobility which need the economy of difference, 
a mobile (and certainly more democratic, as the sneering remark about India and 
Russia can also be motivated by the critical attention drawn to their absolutist 
political systems) economy of the foot and agitation.
Such an economy does not measure the efficacy of its operations with profit 
and other kinds of visual and legal appropriation, but it must take into consider­
ation what is not at the moment visible, what has been lost from and for sight and 
what has only very slowly and indirectly been approached and regained by the foot 
(Shenstone: “When a building . . . has been once viewed from its proper point, 
the foot should never travel to it by the same path which the eye has travelled over 
before. Lose the object, and draw nigh, obliquely”13).
13 The Works . . . , Vol. 2, p. 116.
14 W. Blake, Complete Writings, ed. G. Keynes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969), p. 152.
15 J. Delille, Oeuvres, Vol. VII, p. 5.
IV
To approach the object obliquely, i.e. in an ec-centric, devious, and erratic man­
ner does not belong to the domain of mind but that of spirit. Before one of Blake’s 
proverbs of hell construes an isomorphy between the off-course track and wisdom 
(“Improvements makes strait roads; but the crooked roads without Improvement 
are roads of Genius”14 15), Delille will maintain that the garden is not only an achieve­
ment of an architect but also a statement on spirit and man’s relationship with it. 
While walking along the path of the garden, we need to remember that “F esprit 
demande qu’on le mene par des routes un peu detournees,/ et qu’on lui presente 
des objets inattendus”.13 We can say three things about this horticultural philos­
ophy of spirit. First, spirit {esprit) and man are linked by the sense of urgent care 
which allows spirit to request and expect obedience of man: I’esprit demande. 
Second, man when called by spirit abandons his/her individual self, ceases to be 
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an agent, which does not mean that man responding to the demand of spirit re­
mains passive; just the opposite - man becomes a part of a larger action, of a greater 
agency (since we are in the garden, shall we claim that this force is phusis, or the 
energy of growth?) which transforms the language of action from active towards 
neutral constructions: spirit requests a transformation from je to on {on le mene, 
on lui presente). It is not a regular human subject which encounters spirit on 
a garden path, but an enlarged self which belongs to “nature” understood by Schiller 
as “the uncoerced existence, the subsistence of things on their own, being there 
according to their own immutable laws”.16
16 F. Schiller, Essays, p. 180.
Third, the call of spirit concerns not a certain point or stasis but precisely a path, 
not any path but a way which would be off-course and meandering {routes 
detournees, not one of fashionable seventeenth-century garden mazes, but only 
a gently - un peu - winding road) because it is only such a path that can present 
to spirit what it wants to see - surprising objects {objets inattendus). In Shenstone 
as well as in Delille the foot and the (renewed) eye (see Blake’s project of a new 
theory and practice of vision) play essential role in the domain of spirit.
V
Whereas formerly one general perspcctival view was enough to generate a “slen­
der satisfaction”, now the demand is for a constant change of scenery. If Rapin 
would be satisified with the relationship of identity holding between the “scene” 
and “place” (i.e. with a design where a move from one place to another would 
not necessitate a noticeable change of view), Shenstone considers such a possi­
bility in the categories of suffering, not just a metaphorical discomfort or uneasi­
ness but a most real torture of “actual pain”. The unguarded celebration of the 
eye is now mitigated by a diagnosis of its illness: the long-sightedness of the 
perspectival vista is not any longer a solemnization of vision but the discovery 
of the hidden myopia, of dim-sightedness which previously was neutralized by the 
long-ranging prospect and thus went unnoticed. The late eighteenth-century gar­
den theory tries to describe a certain blindness, an ophtalmological disease, inher­
ent in the works of Le Notre, Descartes, and perhaps even Spinoza. The “man of 
taste” must suffer, feel the “actual pain”, when he encounters a world which has 
been robbed of its freedom (for Shenstone, the “actual pain” is comparable to the 
suffering of a slave labouring “at the gallies”) which means, let us add, a world 
that did not make itself available to the procedures of reading. The diagnosis of 
the crisis of vision, Shenstone’s repetitive critical meditation on the primacy of 
the eye over the foot, can be subsumed under a double rubric: that of ophtalmol- 
ogy (“I cannot see”, or perhaps “I see strangely, my sight is distorted”) and lit­
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erary (“I cannot read”). Shenstone’s defense of the irregular garden design not only 
wants to retrieve a balance between the eye and the foot, between the specular 
and the locomotive, but it also wishes to address the issue of the text. Despite Shen­
stone’s conviction that it is painting that ought to be a guiding art for gardening 
(“I think it is the landskip painter is the gardener’s best designer”17,) his critique 
of the straight line allows one to postulate the text, reading/writing, in a word, 
literature as the hidden agenda for the landscape architect. Even when promoting 
painting as his model, Shenstone approaches it with an eye of the reader: a world 
of the garden is one in which man has to practice a double mobility - that of his 
foot and of his interpretative skills. Neither can remain satisified with what the 
eye sees momentarily but must proceed further and “obliquely” towards the object 
which thus retains the aura of what Shenstone calls “the grace of novelty”. Thus 
we read: “Objects should indeed be less calculated to strike the immediate eye [as 
they do in the geometry of perspective], than the judgment or well-formed ima­
gination .... ”18 The eye with which Shenstone looks at his Leasowes is not an 
“immediate” one, i.e. neither instantaneous nor operating in hurry; the eye which 
one can refer to as a “mediated” one, the eye which takes its time, the prepared 
eye of the cultivated man of taste whose mind is “drawn off from the hurry of 
business”.
'''Ibid., p. 115.
"Ibid., p. 112.
19 D. Hume, Essays . . ., p. 7.
The movement from Le Notre to Shenstone is then a therapy applied to 
the European perception accused of perpetuating the inauthentic vision and 
partial blindness which covers up the disease of short-sightedness by the 
pretence of long-ranging perspective. What the eighteenth-century garden 
recuperates is the sense of minute, short-range vision, the ability of attentive 
and careful reading which allows for the study of details, particular signs and 
in this way permits one to escape the crowds inhabiting perspectival pros­
pects. In this sense the garden (like the Leasowes, for instance), despite its stress 
on salvaging nature from underneath the layers of art, is an extension of a reading 
room or painting gallery; not a place where one rules and dominates over large 
and anonymous expanses, but where one lovingly (Hume: “a delicacy of taste is 
favourable to love and friendship”) practices the meditation on minutiae for which 
one needs either clear sight or a pair of good glasses. Hume modifies a paradig­
matic Enlightenment metaphor of a machine in such a way so that it could be used 
to illustrate our point: “the judgment may be compared to a clock or a watch, where 
the most ordinary machine is sufficient to tell the hours; but the most elaborate 
alone can point out the minutes and seconds, and distinguish the smallest differ­
ences of time”.19 In the Leasowes we are somewhere halfway between Enlight­
enment and Romanticism.
To textualize a landscape means therefore to both open it to the fluidity of 
walking and to, momentarily at least, freeze it in the forms which arc read by our
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eye as objects which we face not only as a part of the script of the eye but also 
as a script independent of the intention of a maker other than the seeing eye. 
Textualizing is a manner of privatizing and individualizing a landscape, of liber­
ating it from a mere relationship of property, of temporarily removing a position 
of the proprietor. As Barnes and Duncan put it: “. . . a landscape possesses a simi­
lar objective fixity to that of a written text. It also becomes detached from the 
intention of its original author, and in terms of social and psychological impact 
and material consequences the various readings of landscapes matter more than 
any authorial intentions. In addition, the landscape has an importance beyond the 
intitial situation for which it was constructed, addressing a potentially wide range 
of readers”.20
20 T. J. Barnes and J. S. Duncan, “Introduction: Writing Worlds”, in T. J. Barnes, J. S. Duncan, 
Writing Worlds; Discourse, Text and Metaphor in the Representation of Landscape (London: 
Routledge, 1992), p. 6.
21 D. Hume, “Of the Standard of Taste”, in D. Hume, Essays . . ., p. 236.
22 The Works . . . Vol. II, p. 126.
25 Ibid., p. 127.
VI
To cure the disease of the eye is to train it in detecting minute elements 
of heterogeneity and difference, to free the detail from the domination of the 
centralist perspective and to open it to (“well-formed”) imagination, to turn 
the eye from the petrifying organ of immediacy into a movable organ of 
mediation, i.e. interpretation. Hume sees in such an operation the perfection of 
an organ: “It is acknowledged to be the perfection of every sense or faculty, to 
perceive with exactness its most minute objects, and allow nothing to escape its 
notice and observation. The smaller the objects are, which become sensible to the 
eye, the finer is that organ . . . . ”21 This scheme which wants to achieve two pur­
poses - to turn the garden as a model world into a script of details, and to make 
man aware of the cultural myopia and semi-literacy - receives auxiliary support 
from philosophy. First, together with the centrality of the eye and its ideology of 
homogeneity (“place = scene”) one must question the centrality of man as an epis­
temological project: the eye in Shenstone’s garden becomes peripheral, loses the 
support of a grand narrative of knowledge, which crisis finds its parallel in a radical 
rejection of the universalizing scheme of a human point of view taken to be THE 
perspective of creation (Shenstone: “Man is not capable of comprehending the 
universe at one survey”22) and a formation of an epistemology which is not only 
fragmentary and, as Shenstone would put it, “oblique” (man is “endued neither 
with organs, nor allowed a station proper to give us an universal view”23), but results 
in a fundamental overcoming of geometry and its rules: once the eye is “cured” 
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of the false and inauthentically universalizing vision of the prospect, man not only 
finds himself in a peripheral position but in a “station” which is profoundly “wrong” 
according to any standard principles of geometry. In Shenstone’s contention “But 
we are placed in the corner of a sphere”,24 we may read either a disclaimer of the 
conventional knowledge (a “sphere” is a figure which precisely does not have 
“corners”), or a promise of a new geometry (where spheres with corners are al­
lowed).
24 Ibid., p. 127.
25 J. Delille, Oeuvres, Vol. VII, p. 155.
26 Ibid., p. 5.
27 R. Knight, The Landscape (London 1795), p. 11.
28 J. Delille, Oeuvres, Vol.VII, p. 157.
29 R. G. Saisselin, The Enlightenment against the Baroque. Economics and Aesthetics in the 
Eighteenth Century (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), pp. 12-3.
The de-placed eye must reveal a profound displacement of man both as 
an ontological and epistemological project. In Shenstone’s attempts at formu­
lating a philosophy-based theory of gardening we may read a critique of Carte­
sianism with its stress upon geometrical optics (and what Delille calls superbly 
“pompeuse ordonnance”2 ); Shenstone’s interest in painting as a model for 
landscape gardening seems to promote another protocol of thinking about 
reality motivated not by the operationalism of a geometry of the whole but 
by the careful perception of the detail. Delille sees the garden as a struggle 
between an architect on the one hand, and poet, philosopher, and painter on the 
other (“En un mot, ses [Rapin’s] jardins sont ceux de l’architect; les autres sont 
ceux du philosophe, du peintre et du poet”26). Richard Knight will be even more 
severe in his judgment; for him geometrical gardens are products of “men with 
minds and hands of a mechanic”27 (Delille speaks of such designers as “froids 
decorateurs”28). The geometry attacked by the English Lustgartnerei is not only 
a matter of architectural design and philosophical premises but also that of econ­
omy which opposes the Baroque cult of excessive spending attached to the royal 
presence. It is hard to overlook the fact that a most spectacular critique of this 
economy must take up the garden as its main object: “The difference between 
baroque spending and the new attitude to prodigality . . . can be exemplified with 
reference to gardens. These, like metaphysical systems, may be taken as paradigms 
of society’s ideological assumptions. The formal garden . . . might indeed be spo­
ken of in connection with Descartes’s universe . . . such gardens are the gardens 
of the king ... In 1678, some 821,000 livres were allotted for the parks and 
gardens. The following year the costs had risen to 965,000, and by 1680 to, 
1,627,000 livres ... By contrast the landscape gardens of the type “improved” by 
Capability Brown implied not only a different aesthetic, based on a different 
metaphysics of nature, but also a new economics”.29
When in Shenstone we read about the garden as a painterly practice, we need 
to understand it partly as an aesthetic instruction which takes us away from the 
economy of spending and mere luxury but partly as an opening of an important 
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ontological insight similar to the one traced in the work of Merleau-Ponty: “Mer­
leau-Ponty, noting that painting, for Descartes, can obviously in no way define our 
access to being, speculates that an attentive study of painting would inaugurate 
another philosophy, one no longer enthralled by the ideals of the conceptual grasp, 
intellectual mastery, and technical manipulation, but willing to interrogate the 
unmotivated and irreducibly complex upsurge of a world ‘which is not matter or 
in-itself”’.30 31
30 V. Foti, “The Dimension of Color”, in G. Johnson (ed.), The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics 
Reader. Philosophy and Painting (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), p. 294.
31 The Works . . ., Vol. II, p. 126.
VII
But this project in which a universalizing perspective is replaced by a sequence 
of peripheral ones is also connected with the philosophically understood problema­
tic of reading presented as an analysis of placing. Looking at the Leasowes 
Shenstone consistently demonstrates his belief that in the garden one can see that 
the power and grace of placing has been denied to man. Thus we read: 
“Art ... is often requisite to collect and epitomize the beauties of nature; but 
should never be suffered to set her mark upon them: 1 mean, in regard to those 
articles that are of nature’s province; the shaping of ground, the planting of trees, 
and the disposition of lakes and rivulets”.3' There are at least two important ob­
servations in this passage which shed some light on the landscape gardening as 
a philosophical project. First, there is a conviction that art remains in a special 
relationship with nature, a relationship of which let us only say for the time being 
that it dictates an awkward form of art’s presence: art is present without being seen. 
Art is a ghost of nature, i.e. a relationship which the garden offers for our 
study is not that between nature and culture but one between the present 
(nature) and the nonpresent which does not mean “absent” (culture).
This invisible intervention, a peculiarly clandestine operation without mani­
festation, can be discovered only by the dislodged, de-placed eye which has rec­
ognized the disease of its former myopia, the reading/interpreting eye of one who 
approaches objects “obliquely”. Second, it is nature not art which is given a force 
of placing, a power of location and grounding, of “shaping” and “planting”. In 
a word, nature has its “province”; a place belongs to nature, to phusis, man can 
only re-place but the grace of placing has been removed from him. And yet it is 
not incidental that Shenstone mentions art rather than just “seeing” in this con­
text: the de-placed eye does more than merely “sees”, registers in one glance the 
reality (as we remember from previous analysis, such an impression is false be­
cause man lacks a proper “organ” which could provide him with such a universal­
izing perspective), it “collects” and “epitomizes” the “beauties of nature”.
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One should not pass these two verbs in silence as it is on them that the Shen- 
stonian philosophy of the garden as the reading/writing practice of the eye largely 
hinges. While looking with the eye no longer myopic, we not only perceive the 
surface of things but intervene into it, find our way to reconnoitre its texture and 
consitency. The eye perceiving the English garden of Shenstone cuts the surface 
of an object, inscribes it with a writing of one specific perspective soon to be 
replaced by another. A thing is a palimpsest of points of view, a combination 
of invisible script of several oblique perspectives replacing one immovable 
frontal view. Another consequence of this ocular scripting is that an object is 
condensed, abridged, to a series of views revealing its various aspects ad facets. 
In a word, the eye does not merely perceives but “epitomizes” {epitome, from Greek 
epitome, epi + temnein, “to cut upon”, a “surface incision”, an “abridgement”).
Such a scripting operation of the eye makes it possible for us to see nature 
not as one homogeneous continuity but as a series of particular and heterogeneous 
shapes, thus the task of man, who is not able to place things, is to “collect” them. 
In this activity we should hear at least three different tones. To begin with, that 
of a human attempt at organizing what constitutes a part of a larger system forever 
closed to our perception; as Shenstone maintains, we have no proper organ which 
could “exhibit to us the variety, the orderly proportions of the system”?2 We 
“collect” in order not to lose grip upon reality which, after our eye has undergone 
its therapy, has become either unintelligible (in the sense of “chaotic”) or ungov­
ernable (i.e. defying man’s power to reason and perceive). Then, there is a social 
dimension which allows one to recognize “collecting” as a manner of displaying 
one’s possessions to the public eye. Both these echoes of the verb to “collect” 
demonstrate what we may refer to as to the “musealization of nature”, i.e. a process 
through which man tries to understand the phenomenon of “placing”. Things of 
nature are approached in this process as belonging to a powerful “province” to 
which man has no access and thus the natural phenomena can be understood only 
in their “abridged” (epitomized) form of a fragmentary perspective and later dis­
played to the eye as a “collection”. The garden is nothing else but a “collection” 
of natural objects, but by this fact it reveals a fundmental change in epistemology 
that took place in the eighteenth century.
32 Ibid., p. 127.
The third echo brings us to the scene of reading, to the garden as a text. By 
“collecting”, that is to say, carefully looking at the minutest details of each par­
ticular fragment of a space, by living a theory that “each place is a different scene”, 
we open the object to reading. There is no reading of wholes; a true reading deals 
only with crumbs and fragments because reading consists in arranging and rear­
ranging these details. To “collect” means to bring fragments together (col=con- 
cum) in order to make them temporarily legible (legere = “to collect” but also “to 
read”). In the eighteenth-century English garden the eye is an instrument less 
of geometry and more of art (we are moving closer and closer to Blake’s fa­
mous instruction which wants us to look “through not with the eye”): it incises *
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the smooth surface of the objects making them scriptible and legible - what 
we read is a writing of our eye upon “trees”, “ground”, “lakes”, the secret 
of whose placing is beyond our comprehension.
The eye is not separated from the world it sees, does not belong to another 
realm, but looks at what it creates and forms. Like in Nietzsche there is no radical 
fissure between language and reality, so in the Leasowes and in the eighteenth­
century Lustgartnerei there is no gap disjoining the eye and the world. The limits 
of my eye are the limits of my world: “Wittgenstein was of the view that we do 
not have, as it were, the world on the one side and language on the other, but rather 
that language in some ways shapes reality . . . Experience is indelibly linguistic”.33 
The visual, as theorized by the landscape gardening in Leasowes, is deeply en­
grossed in the linguistics of the eye and syntax of sight.
33 A. Danto, “Description and the Phenomenology of Perception”, in N. Bryson, M. A. Holly, 
K. Moxey (eds.), Visual Theory (London: Polity Press, 1991), p. 204.
34 R. Saisselin, 77/e Enlightenment against the Baroque . . . ., p. 15.
VIII
The garden is a scene of spirit. Yet the operations and demands of spirit make 
it also a scene of luxury. Not only do we speak of a luxury of finances (although 
Dr. Johnson complains in his biography of Shenstone that the Leasowes estate ruined 
its owner), a prosperity of a land proprietor; we want also to point at a certain luxury 
within spirit itself. Its position is, as we have seen, that of a power which “demands” 
thus turning us into “domestics” of the realm of spirit; its paths are not engineered 
so as to obey the principle of minimum investment of energy coupled with the 
maximum turnout but follow capricious and whimsical turns of one who does not 
have to meet the necessities of life (the roads are detournees\, its operations lead 
to “collecting”, the activity which has always been associated with prosperity and 
accummulation of objects and financial means allowing for their purchase. One should 
note carefully, it is art which performs the “collecting” in question, and it is “na­
ture” which becomes the object of collecting. The luxury of spirit runs contrary to 
the luxury of merely wasteful entertainment; the views which are approached ob­
liquely on the winding path of spirit cannot be appropriated, reified, and displayed 
as a part of social game of power, they must remain ethereal images sealed off from 
the merely curious. The realm of spirit is not only that of the eye but also of the 
foot, and thus it calls, “demands”, an expenditure - or investement - of energy. Remy 
Saisselin grasps this movement away from the geometrical luxury of the eye to the 
locomotive luxury of the eye and the foot well: “The end of Baroque . . . implied 
the etherealization of the concept of art, its purification and dissociation from mere 
luxury, mere entertainment, and mere desire, the distancing of art from ... the 
frivolous curieux,. . . the fashionable women and the idle rich”.34
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The eighteenth-century garden offered a system of the luxury of spirit 
which, on the one hand, was a step towards a Romantic theory of nature but, 
on the other hand, (as it is evident in the work of Repton) allow ed for con­
cealing the reality of labour. The luxury of spirit was purchased at the expense 
of the labour of the eye and the foot; the misery of the body (of a tenant, for 
instance) remained outside its scope.
IX
When Le Notre pretends he sees a system of nature and thus fashions his 
Versaille, Shenstone thinks that he sees merely a series of views which must be 
obliquely approached. The garden is a medium where the discontinuity of nature 
is disclosed: “We perceive many breaks and blemishes, several neglected and 
unvariegated places in the part . . ,”.3S This perception is accompanied by a desire 
to complete what has been left uncompleted and correct nature’s mistaken plac- 
ings. As we read on in the same fragment: . . we might as rationally expect 
a snail to be satisfied with a beauty of our parterres ... as that man shall be sat­
isfied without a single thought that he can improve the spot that falls to his share”. 
This discourse of satisfaction brings us back to the “slender satisfaction” resulting 
from changes of perspective in the seventeenth-century garden and helps us to un­
derstand the use of the adjective: the satisfaction is “slender” because it is a 
fragment of a situation where human desire for the whole has no room to manou- 
ver; it is a desire-less space which can only be looked at but does not leave open 
a possibility for action.
35 The Works . . p. 127.
In the anthropology Shenstone’s garden is a part of, man presents himself as 
fronting the fragment or ruin while his thought moves simultaneously in two 
directions: first, it recognizes the world in which his intellectual grasp must fail 
and the luminosity of his eye must be dimmed (the order of nature to which we 
have no access), and, second, it offers a temporary and provisional project of filling 
the gaps left out by nature and correcting its “mistakes”. While operating within 
the domain of the ruin, man thinks a whole which, in fact, may not be a whole 
at all but merely a temporary profiling of a figure to be replaced by another profile 
revealed by consecutive stages of our march through the winding paths of the 
Leasowes. This sends us back towards the problematic of epitome as incision on 
the surface of things: the work of the dislodged, de-placed eye working in con­
junction with the foot, ruins objects, transforms them from even homogeneous 
surfaces to uneven, broken, ruinated arrangements of details. The garden is an 
epitome of ruination which always occurs in the act of reading, of an atten­
tive study of the detail. In a ruin, thought works towards a completion of details 
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opened to the labour of thought by a previous intervention of the de-placed eye. 
Shenstone clearly marks both operations: “Ruinated structures appear to derive their 
power of pleasing, from the irregularity of surface, which is variety; and the latitude 
they afford the imagination, to conceive an enlargement of their dimensions, or 
to recollect any events or circumstances appertaining to their pristine gran­
deur .... ”36 In other terms, the garden as a structure of ruination transcends the 
limits of the private property and opens up a perspective upon the national: to talk 
about a ruin is also to construct a certain image of the historical past which goes 
beyond the confines of the private. The garden as a ruin both points at the na­
tional identity and undermines it from within. On the one hand, it suggests a possible 
reconstruction of the past glory, on the other, it tells us that the greatness of this 
glory was merely a passing episode; the garden of ruins (particularly in a situation 
when history of art refers to it as the “English”, i.e. of a nationally defined, garden) 
offers a commentary on the transcient character of not only English but generally 
human power: “The ruin provides an historical provenance for the conception of 
the British nation as immemorially ancient, and through its naturalization subsumes 
cultural and class difference into a conflated representation of Britain as nature’s 
inevitable product. But at the same time, ruin imagery cannot help asserting the 
visible evidence of historical and imperial impermanence, for the ruin has been 
traditionally associated with human and cultural transcience.”37
™ Ibid., p. 117.
37 A. Janowitz, England’s Ruins. Poetic Purpose and the National Landscape (Oxford: Black- 
well, 1990), p. 4.
38 N. Royle, After Derrida (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), p. 124.
39 J. Derrida, “Fifty-Two Aphorisms for a Foreword”, in A. Papadakis, C. Cooke, A. Benjamin 
(eds.), Deconstruction Omnibus Volume (London: Academy Editions, 1989), p. 67.
If the garden is literally and figuratively a ruin, then - to be consistent - 
Shenstone can write and think about it only in aphoristic fragments of thoughts; 
all the passages quoted here come from his work called “Unconnected Thoughts 
on Gardening”. If “Philosophy is the ruination of deconstruction; deconstruction 
leaves philosophy in ruins”,38 then the garden of which Shenstone writes is 
a ruination of the philosophy of geometrical optics, although the writing of the 
garden is itself already ruinated by a new thought which can think the garden only 
in ruins. The garden in aphorisms, the garden of aphorisms. In Derrida we read: 
“Despite their fragmentary appearance, aphorisms make a sign towards the mem­
ory of a totality, at the same time ruin and monument.”39
